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DEFENDANT'S CLAIM OF STALENESS FAILS 
BECAUSE THE SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVIT 
DEMONSTRATED ONGOING DRUG USE AND 
POSSESSION 
As set out in the State's opening brief at pp. 9-14, the only difference between the 
search warrant affidavit upheld in State v. Jackson, 937 P.2d 545 (Utah App. 1997), and 
the instant search warrant is that the Jackson search warrant was secured and executed on 
the same day as the trash cover on which it was based and police here secured the search 
warrant five days after the trash cover on which it was based. R55-51. Defendant asserts 
that the trial court correctly concluded that the five day delay in securing the instant 
search warrant rendered any probable cause stale. See Aple. Br. at 3,10; see also R57. 
Contrary to defendant's claim and the trial court's ruling, however, the five day 
difference between Jackson and this case is not fatal to the State's reliance on Jackson. 
As set out in the State's opening brief at pp. 12-13, other courts have upheld search 
warrants similarly secured one to two weeks after the occurrence of the probable cause 
yielding events upon which the search warrants were based. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 
531 N.W.2d 275, 278 (N.D. 1995) (rejecting staleness challenge to warrant based on drug 
evidence found in Johnson's garbage six days before search warrant was secured); Zaner 
v. State, 444 So.2d 508, 510 (Fla. App. 1984) (upholding search warrant issued 14-days 
after controlled buy). 
State v. Dable, 2003 UT App 389, 81 P.3d 783, cited by defendant, see Aple. Br. at 
6-8, is not to the contrary. The affidavit in Dable was determined to be stale because it 
did not state when the confidential informant had purchased drugs from Dable and thus 
there was no way to determine if "so much time has elapsed that there [was] no longer 
probable cause to believe that the evidence [was] still at the targeted locale." 2003 UT 
App 389, Tf 13 (case citation and quotations omitted). Here, on the other hand, the 
affidavit clearly set forth that the events at issue all occurred within the two weeks 
preceding 26 January 2004, the date the warrant was issued. R53-52. Specifically, 
Jessica's arrest for methamphetamine on 15 January 2004 occurred 11 days prior to the 
issuance of the search warrant, and amphetamine residue was found in the Ranquists' 
garbage on 21 January 2004, just five days prior to the search warrant's issuance.1 Id. 
]At p. 5, line 4, of the State's Brief of Appellant, the State incorrectly stated that 
Jessica's arrest for methamphetamine possession occurred 11 days prior to the trash cover 
here. This error was repeated at p. 15, line 9 of the State's brief. Jessica was actually 
2 
Notwithstanding the above, defendant asserts that the lapse of five days from the 
search of his garbage to the securing of the search warrant for his residence necessarily 
rendered any probable cause stale because the affidavit contained no "corroborating 
information, such as information from an informant that [defendant] routinely kept a 
quantity of contraband in the residence," or "surveillance by officers noting traffic in and 
out of the residence consistent with distribution activity[.]" Aple. Br. at 10. Even 
assuming that the corroboration the Court deemed unnecessary to the fruits of the trash 
cover in Jackson, see 937 P.2d at 548, is deemed necessary here due to the five day delay 
in securing the search warrant, the search warrant contained corroborating information. 
Specifically, as noted above, the search warrant affidavit sets out that on 15 
January 2004, just six days prior to the search of defendant's garbage can on 21 January 
2004, his daughter Jessica was arrested for "possession of drug paraphernalia and 
methamphetamine." R53. Presumably, the paraphernalia and methamphetamine found on 
Jessica's person at the time of her arrest were confiscated, yet a mere six days later 
amphetamine residue was found in the garbage can belonging to the residence she shared 
with defendant. R53-52. That amphetamine residue was found in defendant's garbage 
can on 21 January 2004 demonstrates that police did not confiscate all of the 
methamphetamine available to Jessica when she was arrested six days earlier on 15 
arrested six days prior to the trash cover, and 11 days prior to the issuance of the search 
warrant, as set forth above. 
3 
January 2004, or that her supply had been replenished prior to the garbage can search. Id. 
Thus, as set out in the State's opening brief at pp. 14-18, Jessica's recent arrest for 
methamphetamine was relevant to the magistrate's probable cause determination* 
Although methamphetamine on Jessica's person at the time of her arrest was 
presumptively confiscated, amphetamine residue was found in the garbage can belonging 
to her residence just six days later. R53-52. The amphetamine residue found in the 
garbage can thus demonstrated that Jessica—or defendant—continued to use and possess 
drugs even after Jessica's methamphetamine was confiscated. Id. Therefore, the search 
warrant affidavit set forth a "substantial basis" for determining that there was probable 
cause to believe methamphetamine would be found inside defendant's residence on 26 
January 2004, less than one week after it was found in his garbage can. State v. Saddler, 
2004 UT 105, Tf 7, 104 P.3d 1265; see also Johnson, 531 N.W.2d at 278 (recognizing that 
drug use can be a "habituating" and thus "continuing offense") and other authorities cited 
in State's opening brief at pp. 11-18. 
Defendant further contends that probable cause eroded here because police did not 
execute the search warrant until 3 February 2004, or until eight days after the warrant was 
secured, and two weeks after the search of his garbage. Aple. Br. 11-12. UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 77-23-205(2) (West 2004), authorizes police to serve a search warrant for up to 
ten days from the date of issuance: "The search warrant shall be served within ten days 
from the date of issuance. Any search warrant not executed within this time shall be void 
4 
and shall be returned to the court or magistrate as not executed." Thus, under section 77-
23-205(2), probable cause found to exist on the date of issuance is presumed to continue 
for another ten days. As set forth in the State's opening brief, the instant warrant was 
secured on 26 January 2004 and was executed eight days later on 3 February 2004, well 
within the statutory time frame. See Aplt. Br. at 4; see also R52-53. 
BECAUSE THE INSTANT WARRANT IS NOT MEANINGFULLY 
DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE WARRANT UPHELD IN 
JACKSON, IT IS NOT SO LACKING IN INDICIA OF PROBABLE 
CAUSE AS TO RENDER OFFICIAL BELIEF IN ITS EXISTENCE 
UNREASONABLE; THEREFORE THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION 
APPLIES 
For the reasons set forth above, and in parts A-C of the State's opening brief, the 
instant search warrant is not meaningfully distinguished from the search warrant upheld in 
Jackson. That warrant, like the instant warrant, was similarly based primarily on the fruits 
of a garbage can search. See Jackson, 937 P.2d at 547-548. Although the Jackson warrant 
was secured on the same day as the trash cover in that case, other courts have found probable 
cause where the search warrant was obtained one to two weeks later. See Aplt. Br. at 12-13, 
21. Thus, even assuming the search warrant is ultimately deemed inadequate to establish 
current probable cause, "[u]nder these circumstances, the officers' reliance on the 
magistrate's determination of probable cause was objectively reasonable, and application of 
the extreme sanction of exclusion is inappropriate." United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,926 
(1984). 
5 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to reverse the trial 
court's order suppressing evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on $_ May 2005. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
IAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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